What the Supreme Court Said in 2004 On Distinction Between Secular & Religious Morality

Our landmark ruling in Estrada v. Escritor emphasizes that in determining whether the acts complained of constitute "disgraceful and immoral behavior" under the Civil Service Laws, the distinction between public and secular morality on the one hand, and religious morality, on the other should be kept in mind. The distinction between public and secular morality as expressed—albeit not exclusively—in the law, on the one hand, and religious morality, on the other, is important because the jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. Thus, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must have a secular purpose.

[A]ny judicial pronouncement that an activity constitutes "disgraceful and immoral" behavior under the contemplation of the Civil Service law must satisfy the test that such conduct is regulated on account of the concerns of public and secular morality. Such judicial declarations cannot be mere effectuations of personal bias, notably those colored by particular religious mores. Nor would the demand be satisfied by the haphazard invocation of "cultural" values, without a convincing demonstration that these cultural biases have since been recognized and given accord within the realm of public policy. The Constitution and the statutes of the land would serve as especially authoritative sources of recognition, since they are irrefutable as to what the public policy is. At the same time, the constitutional protections afforded under the Bill of Rights should be observed, to the extent that they protect behavior that may be frowned upon by the majority.

Concerned Employee v. Glenda Mayor, A.M. No. P-02-1564, 23 November 2004, 443 SCRA 448 (emphasis supplied, citations omitted)